

# HERMENEUTICAL EXPERIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING AND REFLECTION OF SIGN AND SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS IN THE INTERSUBJECTIVE CONTEXT OF INTERPRETATION

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**Abstract:** *the presented article explores the hermeneutical experience of understanding and reflection of sign-symbolic systems in the intersubjective context of interpretation. The subject of a special analysis is the category of "intersubjectivity" as a prism of interpretation of the semantic structure of philosophical texts.*

**Keywords:** *hermeneutics, philosophy, intersubjectivity, context, interpretation, Other.*

Intersubjectivity as a problem of hermeneutic discourse is one of the urgent and difficult problems of achieving true understanding, since the subject-object interactions established in the process of interpretation require a complete theoretical reconstruction of the specifics of intersubjectivist relations. For a complete understanding of this issue, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the concepts and meanings used, which form the categorical apparatus of philosophical hermeneutics. The emergence of the concept of "intersubjectivity" refers to the philosophical tradition of the twentieth century, and is widely used in analytical philosophy of Rudolf Carnap and in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The concept of "intersubjectivity" is presented by Carnap as a certain intellectual source, acting as a catalyst for physicalism as the most important ontological principle. In the process of developing the direction of transcendental phenomenology by Husserl, the concept of "intersubjectivity" is seen as a problem arising from the difficulty of constituting entities as conscious subjects. Husserl in his work "Cartesian Meditations" emphasizes that "intersubjectivity precedes any objectivity of the world and carries this objectivity" [1]. In this regard, overcoming Cartesian subjectivism made it possible to consider phenomenology from the standpoint of language analysis as the main obstacle to a true understanding of the meaning of a philosophical text in the process of applying basic hermeneutic procedures. The problem of the philosophy of language is reflected in its constitutive nature of its expression and manifestation of the things of the objective world, manifested in the universal patterns of development and interaction between nature and man, as well as communication processes that are part of the mainstream of linguo-philosophical problems. If Carnap pays close attention to the analysis of propositional language - a formalized language that considers the logical-structuralist foundations of statements, then Husserl actualizes the problem contained in the metaphysics of the communication act as a new ontological line. Since intersubjectivity serves as a source for solving the Cartesian problematic, and turns into the only primordial area of reality, the specificity of the approach to its consideration changes decisively. The complexity of understanding the problem of intersubjectivity refers to the paradox of perception of the "Other", acting as a phenomenon, constituted by means of the immanent properties of the "Self", but also presented as a transcendental subject, constituting reality, where the "Self" is its integral part. Awareness of this paradox allows us to state the closed nature of intersubjective perception in the process of implementing hermeneutic procedures, where "to this extent the specificity of the approach to its consideration changes decisively. The complexity of understanding the problem of intersubjectivity refers to the paradox of perception of the "Other", acting as a phenomenon, constituted by means of the immanent properties of the "Self", but also presented as a transcendental subject, constituting reality, where the "Self" is its integral part. Awareness of this paradox allows us to state the closed nature of intersubjective perception in the process of implementing hermeneutic procedures, where "to this extent the specificity of the approach to its consideration changes decisively. The complexity of understanding the problem of intersubjectivity refers to the paradox of perception of the "Other", acting as a phenomenon, constituted by means of the immanent properties of the "Self", but also presented as a transcendental subject, constituting reality, where the "Self" is its integral part. Awareness of this paradox allows us to state the closed nature of intersubjective perception in the process of implementing hermeneutic procedures, where "where "I" is its integral part. Awareness of this paradox allows us to state the closed nature of intersubjective perception in the process of implementing hermeneutic procedures, where "The Other" is presented as the author, and "I" is the hermeneutic. Husserl tries to solve this problem by resorting to the procedure of "phenomenological reduction" [2]. The essence of the phenomenological reduction as the central concept of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl lies in the liberation of consciousness from the "natural setting", taking out of brackets the principles of scientism, based solely on the naturalistic setting of interpretation and understanding.

In Husserl's formulation phenomenological reduction is a combination of various reductions, which include "phenomenological-psychological, eidetic and transcendental" [3]. Thus, the requirement to move from a naturalistic prism to a transcendental-phenomenological one is the instrumental core of this methodological principle. The emphasis in favor of exclusively conscious experiences, followed by an analysis of phenomena perceived by

consciousness as pure entities, abstracted from their materialistic source, allows us to reveal "pure consciousness", revealing its noetic-noematic structure, which, according to Husserl, "is constituted as [something] immanent" [4]. Clarifying the meanings of the phenomenological terminology presented in terms of noesis and noema, it should be emphasized that in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl they should be considered as specific conceptual structures through which consciousness is analyzed based on its essential structural moments. Thus, consciousness is analyzed as intentional, the direction of which is oriented towards the object, which, in turn, appears to consciousness in the variability of the ways it is given, acquiring its own content and being as a result of its constitution. If Noesis is a moment of intentional embodiment of acts of consciousness and includes sensation and meaning formation in the elements, then Noema is expressed as an intentional correlate of noesis, which ensures that the content of perception is contained in the intention of "a special kind of measurement of correlative noetic and noematic modifications" [5]. Thus, the goal of hermeneutics is to extract the true meaning of a philosophical text by attracting interpretative tools, the phenomenological component of the statement, grasped by consciousness in the process of interpretation, undergoes a procedure of consistent reconstruction, carried out through specific philosophical reflection. Violation of the semantic component of previously stable connections, determined by the permanent increase in the accumulated philosophical experience, makes it possible to detect a conflict between the system of meaning-forming concepts and categories.

In our opinion, the problem of understanding the meaning of a philosophical text refers to the need to analyze the hermeneutic experience, characterized by the transmission of the objects under study from the point of individual consciousness to their universal horizon of meanings. Since the process of understanding reveals itself as a system of intentional experiences, insofar as the experience of the Other, addressed in its explication to himself, becomes "a measure of transcendental subjectivity, allowing to overcome the hermeneutic barrier between the author and the hermeneutic" [6]. That is why Husserl, in his Cartesian reflections, seeks to outline the boundaries of potentiality, giving the phenomenological sketch the status of an objective reality of consciousness, which must be paid close attention in the process of hermeneutical analysis. The shift of the field of speculation from the individualistic aspect of interpretation to the intersubjective one, touches upon the problem of intentionality as an attribute of consciousness, revealing the potential possibility of comprehending the original phenomenological framework of the object of understanding - "correlation with an earlier experience" [5]. Clarifying the content of the concept of "intentionality" in the context of phenomenological discourse, the most relevant definition is the definition of the openness and uncertainty of the horizon that the hermeneutic faces. Etymological analysis of the Latin word "intentio", expressing "intention", and "aspiration", are derived from the reflexive verb *tendo*, which means "pull", "direct". The source of gravity in this case is not something explicit and transcendent, but something implicit - enclosed in itself. The interaction of the subject and the object of interpretation, therefore, are "stretched", that is, unstable, depending on the determinants of consciousness. Intentionality, thus, as the substantial core of human consciousness, is a permanent act of multiple identifiable unity, in which it is reflected not as a property of extrapolation of the process of perception, but as an essential condition of any cognitive and hermeneutic act. "guide". The source of gravity in this case is not something explicit and transcendent, but something implicit - enclosed in itself. The interaction of the subject and the object of interpretation, therefore, are "stretched", that is, unstable, depending on the determinants of consciousness. Intentionality, thus, as the substantial core of human consciousness, is a permanent act of multiple identifiable unity, in which it is reflected not as a property of extrapolation of the process of perception, but as an essential condition of any cognitive and hermeneutic act. "guide". The source of gravity in this case is not something explicit and transcendent, but something implicit - enclosed in itself. The interaction of the subject and the object of interpretation, therefore, are "stretched", that is, unstable, depending on the determinants of consciousness. Intentionality, thus, as the substantial core of human consciousness, is a permanent act of multiple identifiable unity, in which it is reflected not as a property of extrapolation of the process of perception, but as an essential condition of any cognitive and hermeneutic act. that is, unstable, depending on the determinants of consciousness. Intentionality, thus, as the substantial core of human consciousness, is a permanent act of multiple identifiable unity, in which it is reflected not as a property of extrapolation of the process of perception, but as an essential condition of any cognitive and hermeneutic act. that is, unstable, depending on the determinants of consciousness. Intentionality, thus, as the substantial core of human consciousness, is a permanent act of multiple identifiable unity, in which it is reflected not as a property of extrapolation of the process of perception, but as an essential condition of any cognitive and hermeneutic act.

In our opinion, such a situation contains a claim not only against philosophical hermeneutics, but also epistemology in general, since the achievement of true meaning rests not only on the above-described problems of finding universal methodological tools, but also on clarifying the nature of the unchanging conditions of the intentionality of consciousness, which is in this particular case, a substitute for cognizable meaning.

In the tradition of dialectical existentialism of the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, hermeneutic intersections are found in the analysis of the problem of the Other, which the author acts as the source of the subject - the text of interpretation, which Sartre considers "experience is interpreted only in the light of the concept of the Other" [6]. The concept of intentionality in Sartre, in the classical manner, is considered as a certain orientation of consciousness towards an object, where consciousness is a transcendence of the for-itself, acting as some kind of impersonal act, the existence of which does not need a subject as such. Consciousness, being a transcendence of the for-itself, is subdivided into being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself is a special kind of phenomenon - an unconscious being that transcends itself in relation to our knowledge of it, needing nothing for its existence. While

being-in-itself is actualized through the unconsciousness of itself, being-for-itself acts as a negation of being-in-itself, being realized as a "deficit of being, and assuming being-for-other" [7]. So Thus, an attempt to resolve phenomenological issues in Sartre's philosophy involves the requirement to clarify the status of the Other and its relationship to the Self, which are extremely ambiguous.

The brightest representative of existential phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as the starting position of understanding, anticipates not self-consciousness as such, but the constitutive role of corporality, which is the main source of comprehension of intersubjective phenomena. The measure of consciousness, in this case, is the degree of human involvement in the world, which is determined by the nature of its implicitness. The understanding of an object, according to Merleau Ponty, is determined by the state of an insurmountable distance between the visible object and the seeing subject, since the coordination of the apparatus of perception of the object is directly dependent on the seer - "the accepted attitude is to interpret any being in the sense of" the object as such "[8]. Due with this, the philosopher gives an example of the perception and understanding of the semantic core of an object in the context of comprehending painting, where the artist acts as a certain direction of vision - a source constituting the meaning, the disclosure of which is similar to the restoration of contact between the visible and the seer. In our opinion, such an approach of the philosopher corresponds to the specifics of the methodological procedure of the hermeneutic circle, where a true perception of an object is impossible without an adequate perception of built-in conditions - parts that are expressed in the sum of things, namely conditions. That is why the philosopher focuses on a person's perception not of abstracted objects of reality, but of their totality - intertextuality and intersubjectivity, expressed in the perception of complex interconnected scenes. Thus, the understanding of the object of hermeneutic analysis is directly related to holistic articulation, namely, in the ability to classify the presented continual-irrationalistic picture of the perception of the author's text into separate elements-narratives.

The requirement in favor of the independence of interpretation from consciousness as a criterion for the objectivity of judgments, presented by Husserl as a constitutive perception of the reality of the beginning, is the most important unit of measurement of reality as such. The process of cognition and interpretation of the world is limited by the limits of one's own consciousness, which, in contact with the experience of the Other, which is transcendent for the latter, allows break out of the limits of the individual isolation of consciousness - "an intentional object as such" [9]. More we find a detailed development of the presented problematics in the phenomenological tradition of Emmanuel Husse, postulating a transition from ideas in which the transcendental connotations of reality, presented in the context of the most objective and apodictically consistent grounds, in favor of primary transcendence, expressed by the inventory of one's own phenomenological experience. Thus, intersubjectivity, in the presented context, acts as an integral component that accumulates external phenomenological experience, inaccessible in its originality to a separate I. Only when building a general interpretation in an intersubjective context of interpretation, it seems possible to detect the phenomenological otherness of perception and understanding of reality as an object of hermeneutic discourse. In our opinion, its objectivity due to the polyvariability of research prisms in the "I-Other-World" system [9]. The concept of the phenomenal body, proposed by Merleau Ponty, takes the main position in this case, as opposed to the instrumental concept of the body of Husserl, who does not see the phenomenological primacy of the latter as a direction-setting source.

Since the philosopher equates the concepts of perception and consciousness, since the first in the process of preliminary cognitive activity is at the same time the second, we do not have indicators indicating what in a particular case is recognized as an idea, as well as matter. It follows from this that matter appears not in the context of something single, but within the framework of involvement in the plurality of causal connections, where it turns into the bearer of the idea as such. The experience of knowing and understanding the world, therefore, unfolds within the aspect of spatiality, where the baseline is fixed in the binary opposition of the subjective and intersubjective modes of understanding. Drawing parallels between the views of Merleau Ponty with the conceptual attitudes of Edmund Husserl, it becomes obvious that the world is revealed not only as a phenomenon of the individual ego, but also as another transcendental one, perceiving and contemplating the same spectrum of reality. It is important to note that, despite the fact that the comprehension and understanding of the world by the first and second does not exclude the factor of its objectivity and singularity, it is alien to the perception of the Self and the Other, which Husserl designates as intersubjectivity. Thus, the problem of comprehending the meaning of philosophical texts in the intersubjective aspect of understanding reflects the ratio of the transcendental-reduced mode of one's own perception of reality with the Other, revealed for "I as something alien and different" [5]. For example, unlike Husserl, Gadamer considers the intersubjective nature of understanding in the form of a dialogue that includes representatives of different eras, which brings to the fore the role of the historical-philosophical and cultural tradition. The built-in hermeneutic in a certain historical and cultural context creates a special hermeneutic orientation, which is revealed within the framework of communicative interactions of representatives of a different historical paradigm.

The Cartesian egocentric prism, containing the principles of methodological solipsism, anticipated the emergence of the phenomenon of intersubjectivity both within the framework of ontological and epistemological issues. Having comprehended the main provisions of the Cartesian narrative image of perception and understanding of reality, Edmund Husserl and Jean Paul Sartre clearly attempt to resolve this problem, while maintaining the basic settings of Cartesian ideas. In an effort to overcome the specifics of the Cartesian provisions of intersubjectivism in the perception and understanding of reality, Martin Heidegger discredits the latter through the internal explication of the ontological determinants of human existence, based on the formula "ego cogito". The continuation of the

presented criticism is also found in the philosophical tradition of Gadamer, who, in relation to the problem of understanding in the context of its intersubjectivity, sees in the phenomenon of "pre-understanding", which contains the entire retrospective historical experience of human consciousness. In our opinion, since the beginning of the 20th century, intersubjectivity as a phenomenon of understanding has undergone serious metamorphoses, coming into contact with criticism from representatives of postmodernism, where the leading role in the decision is given to the specifics of language structures. The ideas of the late Wittgenstein, in particular, the rejection of the position of "logical atomism" as the desire to mathematize and demarcate concepts into a system of strict units of measurement of logic, radically changed the view of the problem of intersubjectivity of understanding, which contains the entire retrospective historical experience of human consciousness. In our opinion, since the beginning of the 20th century, intersubjectivity as a phenomenon of understanding has undergone serious metamorphoses, coming into contact with criticism from representatives of postmodernism, where the leading role in the decision is given to the specifics of language structures. The ideas of the late Wittgenstein, in particular, the rejection of the position of "logical atomism" as the desire to mathematize and demarcate concepts into a system of strict units of measurement of logic, radically changed the view of the problem of intersubjectivity of understanding, which contains the entire retrospective historical experience of human consciousness. In our opinion, since the beginning of the 20th century, intersubjectivity as a phenomenon of understanding has undergone serious metamorphoses, coming into contact with criticism from representatives of postmodernism, where the leading role in the decision is given to the specifics of language structures. The ideas of the late Wittgenstein, in particular, the rejection of the position of "logical atomism" as the desire to mathematize and demarcate concepts into a system of strict units of measurement of logic, radically changed the view of the problem of intersubjectivity of understanding.

Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas take out the defining significance of tradition, which, in our opinion, is an extremely reckless step, since the influence of the cultural context is clearly seen not only in a reliable perception and understanding of reality, but also in the trajectory of the development of the entire Western European civilization as such. .

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